A Defense of Hume on Miracles (Princeton Monographs in Philosophy)

A Defense of Hume on Miracles (Princeton Monographs in Philosophy)

Robert J. Fogelin


Since its book within the mid-eighteenth century, Hume's dialogue of miracles has been the objective of critical and sometimes ill-tempered assaults. during this booklet, one among our prime historians of philosophy bargains a scientific reaction to those attacks.

Arguing that those criticisms have--from the very start--rested on misreadings, Robert Fogelin starts through delivering a story of ways Hume's argument really unfolds. What Hume's critics (and even a few of his defenders) have did not see is that Hume's basic argument depends upon solving the suitable criteria of comparing testimony provided on behalf of a miracle. Given the definition of a miracle, Hume really kind of argues that the factors for comparing such testimony has to be super excessive. Hume then argues that, in actual fact, no testimony on behalf of a non secular miracle has even come on the subject of assembly the precise criteria for popularity. Fogelin illustrates that Hume's critics have continually misunderstood the constitution of this argument--and have saddled Hume with completely lousy arguments no longer present in the textual content. He responds first to a couple early critics of Hume's argument after which to 2 contemporary critics, David Johnson and John Earman. Fogelin's objective, besides the fact that, isn't to "bash the bashers," yet relatively to teach that Hume's therapy of miracles has a coherence, intensity, and gear that makes it nonetheless the simplest paintings at the subject.

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